



CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

United States
of America

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 88th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 109

WASHINGTON, FRIDAY, MARCH 15, 1963

No. 41

Senate

THE CUBAN SITUATION

MR. SMATHERS. Mr. President, were it not for the fact that it comes 16 years too late, I would be most gratified by the unprecedented interest expressed in this body in the conduct of our foreign relations with Latin America—particularly Cuba—and our newly developed attachment to the political and economic conditions existing on that continent.

PRESENT INTEREST IN CUBA

There used to be whole weeks, indeed months, when no word concerning the aspirations and needs of our Latin neighbors was spoken in the Congress. Sometimes years would go by without any tangible action being taken by this body to alleviate the problems in Latin America, or to exalt those people to better solve their own problems. Latin America was not in vogue then. Headlines proclaiming what a prominent American statesman or ordinary Member of Congress said about South America did not come easily in those days. Now it seems the whole Nation, including those—or perhaps I should say especially those—who were most quiet are talk of little but the southern continent. There has been a change in interest and focus. What brought about the change? It was the admission of Communist adherence by a man, named Fidel Castro, who followed the typical pattern of shouting for liberty and democracy, while totally crushing the Cuban people and burying their once bright aspirations for a better life in an improved democracy.

I hope that after the present danger exemplified by Castro's Cuba has ceased to exist—and one day it will, for I fully believe the Cubans will again one day be free—our interest in the welfare of our Latin neighbors will continue.

I hope that we will not quickly forget these dangerous and unhappy days, but will forever be mindful that our own Nation's security and well-being are inextricably bound up with that of Cuba and our Latin neighbors to the south.

One of my deepest convictions is that in today's world where jet-powered airplanes, missiles, and rocketry pull us ever closer physically, our dependence on and need for each other grows exponentially. The two continents of the Western Hemisphere are inextricably bound together. Like the legendary Siamese twins, one cannot maintain a viable existence without the other. Recognition of this fact by the Congress is a necessary step in insuring that our own Nation's future remains economically and politically secure.

SMATHERS' LONG-STANDING INTEREST IN LATIN AMERICA

It was with this in mind that, over the past 12 years, I spoke more than 100 times in the Senate—sometimes briefly, often at length—trying to call attention to the progressive deterioration in our relations with Latin America from that time in World War II, when we collaborated closely with them in joint efforts to stop the Nazis.

I recall, shortly after reaching the Senate in 1951, warning, I believe in my first speech on this Senate floor of our indifference to our Latin neighbors, and

urging our Government to increase its economic assistance to the countries of Central and South America. When the Foreign Relations Committee in August of that year proposed to reduce even the small amount of technical assistance proposed by the administration for Latin America, I told the Senate:

It seems to me that we must not lose sight of our own security, which means of course the well-being and welfare of the entire Western Hemisphere. Above all, we should remember who our friends are. One of the great errors for us to make would be to forget those people who not only are in our own neighborhood, but with whom we have had friendly and beneficial relations for many years.

In July 1954, in another effort to direct our thinking southward, I warned of the Communist threat in that area by saying: "We must assist the anti-Communist forces in Latin America to eliminate the conditions of poverty and illiteracy in which the seeds of communism bloom and flourish. The time for action is now."

With administration and congressional apathy continuing, I declared in June 1955, that "today the Soviet Union is moving into Latin America in an attempt to fill the vacuum we have left there."

Our national leaders in those days were apparently acting on the premise that the good neighbor policy, enunciated and started in the mid-1930's, would somehow work in the 1950's, even though we as a nation did no more about it than from time to time, make a speech calculated to assuage their feelings, but nothing more.

And so, while the United States with generosity and good will unparalleled in world history granted or loaned over \$65 billion to foreign countries around the globe during the years 1947-59, the 21 nations of Latin America—our neighbors, our friends, with 180 million people and with the fastest growing population on the face of the globe—received on the average less than one-fourth of 1 percent of this \$65 billion total.

FROM CASTRO COMES NO POWER

Fidel Castro's coming to power in January 1959 was the beginning of the change in attitude.

We all remember that in the early months of 1959 Castro was the most heroic figure in all the hemisphere in the eyes of the general public. He was the modern Robin Hood, or, more appropriately, a Cuban "Zapata," the legendary hill fighter who fought always against tyranny.

Here was that type of man, it was said, who could revitalise the Latin American nations, who could end and would throw off the shackles of inequality and oppression, who would give the people dignity and self-respect, who could operate a government like our own—one of, by, and for the people.

However, Mr. President, there were some of us who never believed this propaganda.

On January 17, 1960, 2 weeks after he came into power, I signed our television program:

I reserve judgment on the quality of his

(Castro's) ambition, his capacity to administer the affairs of Cuba, his understanding of democracy and his judgment and tolerance.

I questioned if "the people of Cuba have improved their position by merely the change of governments."

These were unhappy and unpleasant days for me—unhappy because I saw communism taking a foothold in the Caribbean with the unwitting assistance and unwitting applause of many here in our own country; unpleasant because my opposition to Castro won for me the disapproval of not only a large portion of my constituents, but virtually all of the press.

MAY OF 1961

On April 17, 1961, we remember, less than 4 months after this administration had come into office, an attack was launched by a group of 1,500 Cubans who had been trained in the far reaches of Guatemala under the supervision of military experts recruited in the United States.

This plan for the invasion at the Bay of Pigs had not been some new development of the new administration because we know that as a matter of fact, these men were gathered together and sent to Guatemala for training in 1959, before the change of administration.

From my own personal knowledge I know that these men had been held and trained for so long a time in Guatemala and other Central American countries that most of them had become disengaged and some had left the ranks in their belief that the U.S. Government would never permit them to try to win back freedom for their own country.

Here in the United States there was great concern as to what determination should be made with respect to these Cuban invasion forces. This occurred prior to the beginning of the invasion. Should they be returned to the United States and dispersed, or should they be permitted to make the effort to free their own homeland?

While I was not consulted officially about this matter, my opinion was asked for by some people in lower echelons of the Government, and it was my judgment that the men should be permitted to make the effort to free their country, for they would never be happy until they had made this noble effort; but, of course, it should be made only after sound military judgment had been obtained that the endeavor had some chance of success.

Everyone now knows of the enormous miscalculations and mistakes that were made.

I think the President, whose final decision it was, did the right thing when he assumed the full responsibility for the fiasco. This was the manful and courageous thing to do. But the fact remains that there was considerable miscalculation on the part of many agencies and persons who had a part in the decision. No one man—he be even the President of the United States—can make correct judgments when he is presented with inadequate information.

The Bay of Pigs is now said to have failed. Had it succeeded, Cuba would have been ours and our problems would have been

(attach #1)
cont

intended to a great extent, although of course, not totally eliminated.

Some, it is now revealed, counseled against the invasion before it occurred. I thought, and still think, the "Go" signal was the correct one, based on the facts then available.

I never did subscribe to, nor do I now, the theory that the Latin Americans would be appealed to our impetuosity or by our show of strength. Latin Americans like leadership and strength; they always have, and they always will.

They have a history of 400 years of respecting, admiring, and looking up to strong leadership. That is why they still continue to admire strong leadership.

Everyone has 20-20 rear vision.

The judgment on the Bay of Pigs can be debated a long time. But surely the man who gave the word "Go; rescue your homeland; defeat and overthrow the Communists" cannot now in fairness have it even suggested that he is timid or afraid of action. Couple this with the acts of October 1962, his quarantine, his confrontation with Khrushchev, and no man can fairly say that this President is not always prepared to act.

It goes without saying that so far as removing Castro and the Communists from Cuba is concerned, it would have been considerably easier to have done it in 1959 or 1960 than it would have been in 1961 or 1962, or than it will be in 1963 or 1964.

For the Island has been continuously fortified and militarized, and more and more modern and sophisticated weapons have been employed.

But no programs were developed in 1959 or 1960; and in January 1961, at the change of administrations, the outgoing one merely passed along the growing problem of Cuba to the incoming Administration, as one passes a very hot potato from his own hand to that of his unsuspecting dinner partner.

I have recited some—and only some—of the instances when I spoke in the Senate and elsewhere in 1961 and 1962, calling the attention of this administration to the need for developing a program having for its ultimate goal the freedom of Cuba. While I have yet to learn of a long-range program, this administration did put into effect, in 1961, the economic embargo which had as its result the denial to Castro of the use of many millions of dollars which he had previously realized each year from trade with this country.

The administration also diligently exercised pressure in an effort to get other allies to stop trading with Castro's Cuba. In this endeavor, the administration was moderately successful.

The administration did, in 1961, initiate a meeting of all the members of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este, in Chile, and did succeed in getting three-fourths of the nations of the hemisphere—for the first time—to strongly condemn Fidel Castro and his brand of communism in Cuba.

That was the first time that such a specific resolution had ever been gotten from the Organization of American States. Since that time, several other similar measures have been adopted, looking toward making life more difficult for the Communists in Cuba; but the problem of communism in Cuba remains and constantly grows.

Mr. President, Cuba is a serious problem, equaling in importance, in my judgment, any that we have in Europe or in southeast Asia or anywhere else in the world. It cannot be swept under the rug, ignored, or minimized; and I do not believe that anyone, or any government, is today trying to do that, because all recognize now the total seriousness of the problem of Cuba.

It is a problem that, if not handled correctly, could quickly lead to nuclear war. It is a problem that may lead to the involvement of the United States and its allies in a bloody conventional war. It is fraught with peril of most every kind; and certainly, therefore, it could not be discussed or debated in partisan terms.

Our Nation's future and the future of the world are too important to be left to the politics of partisan discussion. At a same time, they are important

enough to deserve and bear discussion by troubled and conscientious men and women who are sincerely seeking solutions.

The problem of Cuba, therefore, deserves the best nonpartisan attention of all of our minds in the best and highest tradition of Americans who are earnestly concerned about the future of our country.

Russian troop numbers

Mr. President, in September 1962, while many of us were campaigning, we began to see in the press and to hear over the radio reports about the now-famed buildup of Russian offensive missiles and bombers.

I must say that prior to that time, on many visits in and out of Miami, where the refugee colony makes its headquarters, I had been advised by Cuban refugee friends that they thought missiles were being erected in Cuba. Some gave me handmade maps depicting the location of the alleged missiles; others wrote letters describing them; others merely poured into my ears their suspicions and fears.

I turned over every scrap of this information to the Central Intelligence Agency, where I thought it should go for proper examination and evaluation.

However, Mr. President, it is eminently clear that prior to October 14, the day when the "picture" was finally obtained of missiles actually on site, there was really no hard, provable evidence on hand, not the kind of certain and demonstrable evidence on which a great and responsible nation could act.

There were circumstances and there was considerable talk on the part of refugees regarding a missile buildup; and to me it was apparent that this word was getting to the CIA and to our intelligence outfits for the U-2 flights, which all through the summer had been occurring on a basis of two every month, and which were stepped up to four a month in September.

In September, there were flights on September 5, 17, 26, and 29; in October there were flights on the 5th and the 7th, and, of course, on the 14th. None produced any evidence of the missiles, although the reports continued to come in, and many people began to believe the missiles were there, even though no photograph had shown them. Then, I think, some adjustments began to be made even prior to October 14, although I have no exact knowledge of this. In any event, the overflight of October 14 showed the missiles.

Thereafter, the President of the United States called off his speaking trip, returned to Washington, met with the heads of the CIA, the Defense and the State Departments, and others, and, after great soul searching, evolved a program as to what would be done.

All of us know now that the congressional leadership on both sides was called back to Washington, prior to the President's speech on October 22.

The President announced to those of us gathered at the White House what had developed in Cuba; and, after discussion, he stated what he intended to do. There was comment with respect to additional steps which some of those present thought should be taken. However, the President fully and satisfactorily explained why he felt it was more correct to pursue the course upon which he had determined.

Everyone there, publicly or privately, I am sure, pledged his support to the President and the course of action which the President outlined for the Nation to follow.

I am sure that everyone of us was greatly moved and deeply concerned as the President delivered his magnificent message, in which he clearly pointed out that there would be no toleration of Communist offensive missiles or bombers in Cuba; that the offensive missiles had to be removed; that if any of them was launched at the United States or at our neighbors, the United States would fire back—not at Cuba, but at the source of the problem, the Soviet Union.

I am sure that all of us recall vividly with what great apprehension and concern we lived in the next few hours and the next few days. And as the build-up of our manpower and might in south Florida and the Caribbean speeded up, I

am sure we all recall with what final confirmation relief we heard the announcement that Mr. Khrushchev had in effect, withdrawn all of the offensive weapons.

We truly, as the Bible says, "walked through the valley of the shadow" and emerged unscathed.

Mr. Khrushchev did not wish, at this time at least, to start a war over Cuba, for he agreed to back his missiles and bombers out of Cuba, which must have been humiliating and awkward for him. While we did not get the on-site inspection asked for, because of Castro's intransigence, nevertheless the Communists permitted our planes to fly at low altitudes over the missile sites, without gunfire being directed at them, and permitted inspection by our airplanes and our surface ships of the missiles and bombers being returned to the Soviet Union.

It is also worthy of note that today our planes are daily flying low and high over Cuba, for inspection purposes, and none of the very effective antiaircraft weapons—the SAM, the SA-2, and others which have great efficiency—have been fired at our planes. Mr. Khrushchev realized that the President was and is ready to go to any extremity to get those offensive weapons—a threat to U.S. security—removed from Cuba, and, furthermore, that he had to be satisfied that they were removed. That is why the Communists have permitted the flights every day over Cuba to observe what is happening with respect to missiles, troop concentrations, and removals. No shot has been fired at our photographic planes, and none will be fired, because the President has made it crystal clear he will not permit it without instant retaliation.

Mr. Khrushchev, having also agreed to withdraw some of the 17,000 troops remaining in Cuba after the missiles and bombers left, is now in process of doing that. How many have left, I do not know. But State Department sources indicate that some 2,500 have left, and also even some of the units of the four armored groups that were there.

I was pleased to note in the March 9 issue of the Washington Star, however, that Mr. Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet Foreign Minister, stated that a substantial pullout would be completed by mid-March, as Mr. Khrushchev had promised. I am certain that President Kennedy is exerting all the influence he can to see to it that all the Russian forces are withdrawn from the island.

It is interesting to see what some people—now that the critical danger has receded—have chosen to criticize. When the President, in late October, held our national and individual destinies in his hands, few voices were heard; almost everyone was breathless while the President spoke clearly and firmly. I, for one, did not have much to say, and I do not recall that anyone did.

Now, however, there are loud cries and criticisms of an intelligence gap between September and October, of inter-agency confusion, over concessions made or imagined, and so forth. But the important thing to remember is that the President when confronted with the actual direct threat to the security of the United States acted with consummate courage and skill to protect our national interest. He acted in accord with the highest traditions of American statesmanship and successfully eliminated a threat of monstrous proportions to our national existence.

Because the Constitution of the United States puts into the hands of the executive branch of the Government—or the President of the United States—the final authority and responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs. I think he should be permitted without personal harassment or political attack to proceed along this logical line of getting Soviet troops removed from Cuba, for I would challenge anyone to suggest that there is a more useful course of action looking toward the total solution of the problem of Cuba than that of removing the troops and technicians of the Soviet Union from Cuba.

But Mr. President, what of the future? What are our long-range goals?

Certainly, they are to see Cuba freed. But do we have a program or a plan

of action? If so, please let me know.

(attach # 7)
cont.

crime he does not have to tell it to anyone. I have not heard of any plan, and I think if we are to free Cuba and keep the rights of our Latin neighbors we have to have a plan or a program which we can logically follow to a final and happy solution of a free Cuba.

Now I would like to offer a program, or plan of action, but before doing so I want to make it clear I speak only for myself. I speak only for the junior Senator from Florida. I have not cleared this speech with anyone. This voice is speaking only for me.

In the past I have recommended all sorts of programs of action. I have talked about a combination of measures, embargoes, quarantines, economic measures, political measures, propaganda measures, diplomatic measures, and others. But at no time have I recommended that the United States declare war on Cuba or act unilaterally with our own military force.

Since the buildup of weapons and men in Cuba last fall by the Soviets, the situation has changed. We now have a new dimension to consider, the possibility of direct confrontation of Soviet troops and United States troops.

Furthermore, in the light of the enormous amount of military equipment put into Cuba, we have a much more difficult situation to deal with than we did in 1959 or 1961.

When we talk about strong measures today, particularly when we imply force even though we may not say it, we are in reality talking about a direct confrontation of the military forces of the United States with the military forces of the Soviet Union, unless we first are successful in getting these forces out of Cuba. Such a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States forces we have not had thus far in our history.

During the Korean war, while we fought the Red Chinese and undoubtedly many Soviets, nevertheless they operated clandestinely under color of the North Koreans and/or Red Chinese. However, so long as the Soviet military troops remain in Cuba, the prospects of escalation in Cuba into total war are infinitely greater because any unilateral action against Cuba, or even action led by U.S. forces puts, for the first time, U.S. military forces in direct confrontation with those of the Soviet Union.

As stated, I think this adds a new dimension of danger to our already difficult problem.

I do not go so far as to say that we should never act, or that we should not proceed, even if some of the military of the Soviet Union stay there. I would emphasize, however, that the solution to the problem of Cuba, which means the elimination of communism from Cuba, is infinitely easier without the Soviet forces there. I say that their removal will diminish greatly the prospects of whatever action is finally taken in Cuba escalating into a total world and nuclear war. It has been the consideration of this problem, the gravity of it, the enormity of it, the complexity of it, which has made me feel that the President is on the right track in first getting removed from Cuba the offensive missiles and bombers and, thereafter, insisting upon the removal of the Soviet personnel.

Furthermore, we must keep in mind that today, when we suggest further action, either in the form of blockade or a raid, this involves the use of force. And force, of course, means war. It might be limited and small—or it might be unlimited and staggering in its consequences. When we embark on a blockade of an island like Cuba, for it to be effective, the blockader must make up his mind he may have to go to the length of shooting and sinking a surface ship as one starts into Cuba with supplies and personnel, or of shooting down an aircraft which is loaded with supplies and personnel.

In any event, the act of shooting a plane or a ship is an act of war and, as the President said in his last news conference, any such action on our part will probably call up an immediate response.

Furthermore, let us be sure when we talk of force and war we know what we are talking about. This use of force, this war we are talking about is not a cold war waged in the daily press and

over the conference tables. It is not a war of words in which our Secretary of Defense corrects the blusterings of the Soviet Defense Minister on the number of operative U.S. missiles or the size of our thermonuclear bombs. Not even a guerrilla war in which railroad bridges are destroyed and crops burned or sugar mills sabotaged.

We are talking about a war in which troops storm a beachhead, where platoons are sent to knock out a bunker, a war in which villages are destroyed by artillery fire, a war in which lives would be lost and men maimed and crippled for life, a war which could well leave fatherless thousands of children.

There may be some who think that now is the time for war. Some who advocate, rather glibly, that American forces turn quickly on Castro's Cuba—and get the job over with. It may come to that, but everyone should know exactly what they are talking about. I hope they have given thought to not just the phrases but the consequences as well.

How many American troops, for example, would be required to die in order to land a large effective fighting force on an island which has 150 coastal defense missiles and operational sites for most of them? These missiles can reach troop ships 40 miles out. How many troops, landing craft, and even transports could be sent to the bottom of the Caribbean by a dozen operative missile launching torpedo boats, whose launch range is 15 miles, which the Cubans now have?

How many aircraft would be lost in attaining air superiority over a small island with 500 surface to antiaircraft missiles and defended by 100 MiGs, over 40 of them capable of matching our F-104 Starfighter in performance and all piloted, we must presume, by skilled aviators and directed by 200 modern radars?

How many soldiers would be lost in subduing a force of some 75,000 regular and, we must presume, fanatically indoctrinated troops, fighting on their home ground, and backed by at least 100,000 militiamen and 100,000 home guard troops?

They are fully equipped with tanks, field artillery pieces, antitank guns and other modern weapons. They are a formidable force and would be operating defensively, taking a tremendous toll of any liberating force.

Once a beachhead for the liberating force was established how long would the battle for the island take?

How many casualties, American casualties, would it take to subdue Cuba? I have no access to contingency plans but we hear figures such as a month and 100,000 casualties. I gather that our military planners see a quick, glorious charge up San Juan Hill now. Rather they envision a long, grueling, and bloody war waged in the most exhausting and savage tradition of the 20th century world wars.

And would the war for the liberation of Cuba remain limited?

I challenge anyone to say he knows. We can carry on some logical speculation. It might be a war confined to the island of Cuba and the waters surrounding it.

Or it might be a war which precipitates a Soviet move into Berlin with all that implies. Or action in Cuba might precipitate full-scale conflict in southeast Asia, particularly South Vietnam or Laos.

Or how do we know that the war to liberate Cuba will not really touch off the total thermonuclear conflict which each of us prays daily will not occur. Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky says it will. Can we assume he does not mean it?

Our Defense Secretary has said we will defend Berlin—with nuclear bombs if necessary—and I am sure every man in this Chamber approves this stand and knows that Mr. McNamara spoke for the President when he said it. We know the United States means it, that we will defend West Berlin and if necessary with nuclear weapons.

Malinovsky has said essentially the same thing about Cuba. Can we be certain he does not mean what he said? Can we be as certain that he does not

mean it as we are certain that Secretary McNamara does?

I do not know. To take action which could imperil the national existence on the basis of a pleasant and encouraging assumption would be one of the greatest gambles in history. I believe that it is within the context of real and violent warfare that the calls for a blockade or an all-out assault on Cuba must be evaluated. Well, if war is the final answer, if any Member of this Chamber feels it is worth it at this point in order to clear Russian troops from Cuba, he is in the right place to call for it.

As we all know, Congress has the right to declare war on Russia, on Cuba, and the first step is for one of the Members of the body to submit a resolution declaring the existence of a state of war. This has not yet been done, and I do not think it will be done any time soon.

However, while the consequences of any meaningful action are extremely grave, we must nevertheless not be frightened out of doing our duty or living up to our traditions of fighting for freedom.

As we look at the present situation and talk about it with some appreciation of what we are talking about, let us not fail to offer solutions, if we think we have them, but let us make whatever suggestions we have in the realization that the problem is a bipartisan matter and that if we become totally involved, bullets do not merely pick out Democrats or Republicans. Neither red-blooded Americans nor bullets know partisanship.

In this context of understanding, without political motivations and only in an effort to be helpful to the President of the United States, who, of course, has to make the final decision for all in this Nation on matters of this character, I would like for the next few minutes to discuss the situation as it exists today, and what I think we may have to do in the future, and why.

I think we must first settle in our minds whether or not this Nation can long abide Fidel Castro and communism in Cuba.

I know that there is a small body of opinion that would say because Cuba is now too dangerous for us to feel with, therefore, we should do nothing about it except ignore it and hope it goes away.

I am not one of those who subscribe to that theory of hoping it will go away. For hope has yet to remove a Communist dictatorship anywhere in the world.

Tightly controlled police states do not wither on the vine. I do not believe the Communists will surrender merely because we hope they will.

There are others who subscribe to the containment theory as the policy to follow under present circumstances—the easiest policy to follow. Containment is the recognition of the status quo within a country, while at the same time restricting its overt actions outside its borders. However, the danger from Cuba today does not lie solely in the fact that it may attack over the border a neighbor country. We are pledged to and we can easily stop that.

The danger in a continuing Communist government in Cuba, even though contained within Cuba's physical boundaries, lies in that Cuba will continue as it is now, the fountainhead of subversion, propaganda and training. We can stop the exportation of its troops to other lands, but we cannot stop the exportation of its ideas, its propaganda, its training of subversives.

Millions of tons of literature depart Cuba for other Central and South American countries every month. Propaganda broadcasts to Central and South America have been increased in the last 18 months from 20 hours a week to over 150 hours.

John McCone, Director of the CIA, admitted recently, and it was made public, that some 1,500 revolutionaries from other Central and South American countries trained in Cuba last year. This type of activity is almost impossible to stop, short of expelling the Communist government itself.

However, the greatest danger of a "contained" but "continuing" Cuba under communism is that it harasses and renders ineffective our long-range program of helping our Latin American neighbors develop their own free programs.

(attach #7)

As I well know, Allianca Para el Progreso is a program calculated to build up the economy, the standards of living, and the literacy of the people, through economic and technical aid from the United States, while simultaneously effecting tax, land and social reform from within.

It envisages the expenditure of U.S. funds in the neighborhood of close to \$1 billion each year for 10 years. For this noble purpose, however, Mr. President, Latin America needs 90 percent more funds than this. It was reasoned that these additional large sums would be supplied from two sources: First, the country itself; and second, private capital. However, neither of these two sources is available if communism remains in Cuba.

As the Alliance was planned, 80 percent of the contribution was to be made by the Latin Americans themselves, both through their governments and through private investment. However, with local governments, such as Venezuela, expending their time and energies in building up their armed forces, staying busy putting down Cuban instigated riots, spending their money and energies on day-to-day existence, the deep economic and social problems will never get either the attention or the money which their solution require.

And private investment, either of Latin American or United States origin, is obviously going to look for more stable and secure markets, even if the interest rate is not as high as it currently is in Latin America. A corporate executive is not going to put his stockholders' money into an area where it might be confiscated without any reimbursement, as was done in Cuba, nor is a private individual going to invest his savings in a land which may fall under Communist influence at any given moment.

As an example, the flow of new U.S. private investment in South America has plummeted in recent years. In 1957 U.S. citizens and businesses put \$1.162 million in direct investment into the area. By 1961 direct new investment had dropped to only \$1.11 million, a drop of more than 70 percent. This figure comes from the Bureau of International Commerce of the Department of Commerce.

Government sources estimate that when the 1962 totals are finally calculated they will show flow back to the United States of more than \$10 million. In other words, more U.S. private capital was pulled out than was put into Latin America in 1962.

In the case of needed private investment from Latin sources themselves, the situation appears equally critical.

Because of the threat of a Communist-type dictatorship in most every country of South America, local capital is fleeing in enormous amounts out of Latin America into banks and investment in Switzerland, Great Britain, the United States, and even Hong Kong.

The Alliance for Progress is the most realistic, long-term attempt we have ever made to help the Latin American nations out of the cycle of poverty, ignorance, and illness, in which for centuries they have been caught. It must not fail if we are to keep the countries to the south of us in the column of the free world. Yet there can be no doubt that the continued existence of Castro's Cuba insures its eventual failure. Because the Alliance, operating by itself does not have the money to do the job, because the U.S. Treasury cannot fill the vacuum caused by the fair of investment on the part of outside private capital and the flight of local capital.

This means Mr. President that Fidel Castro and communism must go before we can get moving on the big job of realizing the aims and ambitions of the Alliance for Progress.

How then can we get Castro and communism out of Cuba? I see only two alternatives.

First, we can, through various sources, attempt to foster an internal defection and uprising against Castro—in effect, turn Castro's own weapons back on him. This has some appeal primarily because it looks easy, but the lessons learned from Nazi Germany and Hitler, my name to you, is that an uprising against a Communist totalitarian state is not likely to succeed.

No doubt there are in Cuba huge numbers of people among the military, the compassions, the laborers, and in fact among all groups and classes, who are preparing for the seizure of Castro and the Communists. But in a land under communism, overridden with informers, and disciplined by brutal secret police, the organization and execution of a revolt or mass defection is an infinitely difficult thing. Perhaps it could be successful in Cuba, but being realistic rather than romantic, we should not count on it.

It seems to me in searching for a plan of attack, we must face up to the fact that there is no easy or inexpensive short-run solution to the problem of Castro and communism. There was in 1959. It might have still been easy in 1960, but no longer.

Realizing the problem of Castro and communism will not be solved overnight. I suggest putting into action a long-range plan which envisages only ultimately, and, in the final analysis, if need be, the use of force in order to get rid of Fidel Castro.

However, if it comes to force, the program envisages Latinos and Cubans, who believe in freedom, leading that force against the Latin Communists of Fidel Castro. In other words, the program envisages Latinos-for-freedom, versus Latinos-for-dictatorship.

After all, the problems posed by Castro are greatest with respect to the Latin American nations, and as such it is the Latin nations which should begin to bear an increasing responsibility for bringing about a solution.

More specifically, communism has established its hemispheric fortress in Cuba and, in the final analysis, it should be, and can be the Cubans who assume the leadership in what will have to be of necessity a joint undertaking.

The value of turning to the Latin to provide the leadership and most of the manpower required to do the job, returns the problem to its proper place as a Western Hemisphere problem, to be handled within the framework of already existing treaties and agreements entered into by all the Western Hemisphere countries.

Furthermore, there is no sense in purposely bringing about a situation in which Mr. Khrushchev, already ignorantly removing his missiles from Cuba, is required once again to either back down or fight, because of direct confrontation with our troops, or a specific challenge from us.

I do not know, and I do not believe anyone does, just how far Mr. Khrushchev believes he can back up before he destroys his own position, with his ally the belligerent Chinese Reds, or with his own military leaders within the Soviet Union.

I see no point in plotting a course at this time that does not afford Mr. Khrushchev a door through which he can move to avoid confrontation with us, if he wants to. This program which I shall suggest, in which the action taken is called for and lead by Cubans and Latinos, in some measure avoids the confrontation and thereby lessens the possibility that, if and when force comes into use, the encounter will escalate into total war or nuclear war.

If the Cubans and other freedom-loving Latinos are to take charge of the Castro problem, there must be a rallying point for them, a central body which can focus and direct their efforts. I see no group which can do this, which can speak in the name of all the Cuban people, except a fully constituted Government-in-exile which is recognized by us and other hemispheric nations. We should acknowledge its power to make treaties, conduct foreign relations, borrow money, establish armed forces, and enter into all activities of a regularly constituted government. As I understand it, from international lawyers dealing regularly with such matters, our recognition of an exile government would be preceded by withdrawal of recognition of the present regime.

The only argument I have heard against such a government-in-exile is, How will it be formed when all the exiles are divided as to who or what group will lead it?

First, I am certain that any government selected by the Government of the United States and supported by a exile Government of Cuba will in fact be the Government-in-exile. However, there is a more democratic method of procedure if our officials want to follow it.

The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and Refugee Committee have the names and addresses of every refugee in the United States and Puerto Rico. Why not send each one a ballot, asking him or her to write their first, second, or third choices down—first of like an acientee ballot now in an our States of the United States.

It would be relatively simple to carry out a poll by mail and under the supervision of a group of prominent exiled Cuban jurists, in which each exiled Cuban adult is asked for a free expression of who should head an exile Government. No doubt, there would be some errors and duplication—but is inevitable—but it would provide a consensus and would give support to the man or men who finally act as the Government-in-exile.

Once it was established who the Cuban people had selected to lead the fight to free their homeland, U.S. recognition should be hastened.

This would emphasize to the other hemispheric nations that the efforts of free Cubans to expunge communism from Cuba have our full support and lead to recognition of the exile Government by other hemispheric nations.

Moreover, these are nations in Latin America which could act as host to the Government-in-exile. I will not bring about their subjection to pressure and harassment by mentioning their names here. But they have made it clear that they would allow a Cuban Government-in-exile to operate from their soil.

I am not suggesting that the Government-in-exile be the government which takes over the power of Cuba once the freedom of the Cuban homeland has been regained. On the contrary, it should be understood that the Cuban Government in exile maintains our recognition only so long as it totes to free Cuba and, thereafter, hold a democratic election on Cuban soil with all the people of Cuba participating.

Once formed and established, the Cuban Government, under the Rio Treaty of 1947, the Caracas Agreement of 1954, the Punta del Este agreements of 1961, and, in fact, the basic provisions of the Organization of American States, could call upon all the nations of the Western Hemisphere for military and financial assistance. And under those provisions we and the other nations are legally and/or normally obliged to help. With this military equipment they could begin to tighten the noose on Fidel Castro.

The Cuban Government-in-exile would itself be able to, with the use of PT boats and other craft acquired from throughout the hemisphere, place a submarine type blockade on the Island of Cuba, cutting off the supply of oil and other essential supplies needed for Castro's armed forces.

Simultaneously, it could foster defection within Cuba by providing arms and munitions to those who would turn against Castro. This, I submit, is the only realistic course to follow for those who rely on the defection from within alternative. Help from outside Cuba is needed, and Cubans could supply it all.

Propaganda barrages could be established with Cubans turning to Cuban. The Government-in-exile could ask and insist, under the treaties, that all Latin American nations which had not already done so, close their shores to Castro's emissaries. This would stop most of the subversive propaganda now the air of Cuba. The Cuban Government, acting in the name of freedom, could ask that all trade with Castro be stopped. They can ask this cooperation from all members of the OAS, whereas the United States which is technically not involved, could not.

Cubans could easily smuggle goods to the underground in Cuba without having to run the gauntlet of the U.S. Immigration and Border Patrol agents, who could stop them and deport them to the United States.

(attach 1)
cont'

in the long run, with an
eame to revolution, supported and sup-
piled by all the nations of the Western
Hemisphere, could recruit sufficient defec-
tion within Cuba to topple Castro,
and, of course, that is to be desired.

But, if in the final analysis it were
needed, that exile Government could under-
take the liberation of its home by the
force of arms. As a member of the OAS,
and under the provision of the treaties
of Rio and Caracas this Government
could call on other member nations for
whatever assistance would be required—
including arms—to bring about a suc-
cessful conclusion to their efforts. Under
the commitments imposed on the
United States and the other hemispheric
nations by longstanding treaties, we
would be legally bound and acting within
the dictates of our international obligations
in answering the Cuban exile Gov-
ernment's request for help.

Surely, we and the other nations of
the Western Hemisphere would respond,
just as we responded to the call of the
English and French in World Wars I and
II. We would respond because we be-
lieve in freedom and the right of self-
determination, and it is just as precious
and dear in this hemisphere as in the
Continent of Europe or the far away
reaches of southeast Asia.

The proposal is not a roadmap to
utopia. Liberation of Cuba by forces
directed by a government-in-exile is a

far distant prospect. There would have
to be a time-consuming buildup of
governmental organizations, operating
funds, and troops. The problems would
be large.

But similar problems have been faced
before and overcome. There is more to
bind together the various groups of Cu-
ban exiles than there is to divide them.
And the promise of realistic help in re-
turning to a free homeland would be a
powerful lever in bringing about pres-
sure in the direction of unity.

Properly organized and motivated, I
feel that it could take effective action.
I believe that people by the hundreds of
thousands on the Latin American con-
tinent—from the humblest campesinos to
chiefs of state would realize that this
Government was acting for all of them
and would make common cause with it.
Tens of thousands of young men from
all over the continent would, I believe,
join the ranks of its fighting forces.
This exile-Government could provide a
living illustration that the battle cry
of freedom still rings clearest in the hu-
man heart.

A Cuba Government-in-exile is the
force which, acting on behalf of and in
the name of the Cuban people, can bring
about the liberation of their island.
This is the group which can properly
take any and all action necessary to

successfully wage a war of liberation.

Once communism and Castroism are
eliminated in Cuba the United States
must continue its interest in Latin
America. We must continue our pro-
gram of long-range assistance to enable
the Latin governments to bring about a
better life for their people. We must
reform our thinking and remember that
we exist side by side, interdependent,
whether communism threatens or not.

Mr. President, I said early in my re-
marks that I believe one day Cubans
will again enjoy the blessings of liberty,
freedom, and self-government. No mem-
ber of this body wants more than I
to see that day come and to hasten its
approach.

I have today presented a plan which
I think can free Cuba. I feel it is a sen-
sible and logical course of action and
commend it to those who are searching
for ways to free Cuba and drive com-
munist from the hemisphere. In the final
analysis the President of the United
States makes the final judgment—the
ultimate decision, as to what will be
this Nation's course of operation. I am
sure he is prayerfully considering all pro-
posals suggested as to what course to
follow. Whatever his decision I intend
to support the President in whatever action
he takes. I know that all citizens
and patriots will do likewise.

(attach #7)
cont